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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the effect of state subsidy on the behavior of entrepreneur and ven-
ture capitalist in a double moral hazard and fixed investment model under posi-
tive externalities. We infer that investment subsidy and success fee improve the 
incentives, ease credit rationing, hence boost private financing, which explains 
the popularity of hybrid venture capital systems. The main disadvantage of these 
systems is, however, that the entrepreneur is encouraged to minimize his/her 
own capital investment and to ask for the maximal state subsidy available. It may 
happen that public sources go to entrepreneurs capable to finance their projects 
privately, so state subsidies increase state deficit (and private profits) without any 
effects on public welfare leaving other important areas underfinanced. We also 
prove that state guarantee definitely creates perverse incentives, hence it is not 
recommended in our model.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We distinguish inventor and innovator in an innovation process, the former has 
a new idea, whereas the latter possesses already a patent, a product, a project, or 
even a formal enterprise (Stiglitz–Greenwald, 2014). The first question arising in 
economic policy is to decide to what extent invention or innovation should be 
subsidized by the state. Stiglitz–Greenwald (2014, Chapter 6, Appendix D) pre-
sents the mutual interaction of the two areas: innovators monopolize common 
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knowledge (e.g. by patents), but also improve it by financing industrial research 
projects. Stiglitz–Greenwald (2014) analyze this dynamic interaction through 
an example of a fishpond where fishes symbolize new ideas, and fishermen are 
the innovators who occasionally spend some part of their profit for fish resettle-
ment (invention). They prove that an external subsidy to fishermen decreases fish 
population and creates a steady state where also fishermen’s profit will be smaller. 
Translating it, a subsidy of innovation withers fundamental research exhausting 
the “fishpond” of our common knowledge, and so the intervention will result in 
an opposite effect in the long run: both the level of innovation and the economic 
growth will get lower. It is a commonplace in economics that goods with positive 
externalities (i.e. with spill-over social impact), like fundamental research, will 
suffer underproduction if we leave everything to the market. This implies that the 
state should rather support and finance fundamental research than encourage 
innovation directly. Stiglitz–Greenwald (2014) identify a radical review of prop-
erty rights and more subsidy on export as key tools for stimulating innovation. 
Mazzucato (2012) extends the concept of “entrepreneurial state” and describes the 
role of the state in fostering innovation in an overall strategic framework. In the 
sequel, we put aside this dispute and restrict ourselves to investigate the role of 
direct state subsidy in innovation on project realization.
The main characteristics of early-stage innovative projects are a high-level risk 
and uncertainty, a sharp asymmetry in information (the entrepreneur knows the 
project and his own efforts better than outer players), and significant positive ex-
ternalities. These characteristics together make innovation much more difficult 
to finance. On the one hand, negative consequences of informational asymme-
try, moral hazard, and adverse selection occur increasingly, so both contractual 
incentives and screening and monitoring systems must be set with an extra care 
(Jáki et al., 2017). On the other hand, requirements of risk management are con-
trary to incentive aspects in general, e.g. excessive safety results in complacency 
and laziness (Pauly, 1968). 
Trade-offs get even more complicated if the state, or EU, or some other external sup-
porter interfere in favor of positive externalities since subsidies modify also risks 
and incentives. Combining this with the high degree of uncertainty around inno-
vation, we must be prepared that venture capital market will be neither complete 
(we cannot have an insurance for every future event), nor perfect (there may be 
significant frictions due e.g. to costs of transactions or agents), nor efficient (there 
may occur large mispricings). Also, Kornai (2010) emphasizes that flexible and ac-
cessible financing is a key condition for widespread innovation, see also (Berlinger, 
2017). This means that a careful mechanism design can create high value. 
In practice, complex contracts, screening mechanisms, and monitoring systems 
are developed to handle (or to reduce at least) the above problems (Karsai, 2013). 
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A frequently applied structure is stage financing, and it is common to give strong 
control rights to the external financer (Aman–Lovas, 2015; Lovas et al., 2015). The 
main difference, however, between (active) financing of a venture capitalist and 
(passive) financing of a bank is that a venture capitalist participates actively in re-
alizing the project by advising, reorganizing, networking, etc., and so she person-
ally contributes to the success (or failure) of the project. Thus, we expect from an 
optimal financing scheme to motivate not just the entrepreneur but also the ven-
ture capitalist to make efforts, i.e. it should manage moral hazard on both sides.
For the sake of simplicity, we disregard the problems arising from risk manage-
ment, uncertainty, adverse selection, transaction cost, etc. (we assume that the 
parties are risk neutral, every decision parameter is known, both entrepreneurs 
and financers are homogeneous, there is no transaction cost), and focus on the 
effect of state subsidy on single and double moral hazard in financing. We in-
vestigate double moral hazard in a model where entrepreneur and financer are 
extremely interdependent: the project has a positive net present value only if both 
entrepreneur and financer do their best for the success.
It is widespread in theoretical literature that state subsidy ruins incentives but 
helps to create positive externalities (increases free sources available), and the ul-
timate net change in welfare depends on which effect is stronger (Lovas–Mile, 
2015). There are mixed results in the literature concerning the empirical expe-
riences (Becsky-Nagy–Fazekas, 2017; Karsai, 2015 and 2018; Jáki–Molnár, 2017b), 
however, professionnals tend to agree that in Hungary, negative effects are domi-
nating (Kállay, 2014).
We prove the surprising result that in our model, the motivation of the entrepre-
neur entails the same for the venture capitalist automatically, hence there is no 
significant difference in handling single or double moral hazard. This conver-
gence of interest goes wrong only in the case of a state guarantee. The form and 
size of state subsidy are important: investment subsidy and success fee may create 
value if done properly, but guarantee (or bailout) destroys incentives, therefore, its 
optimal size is zero even in the case of large positive externalities. Thus, we model 
the symptoms of soft budget constraint (Kornai et al., 2003), but we cannot ex-
plain why it pays off for the state to intervene in this form, thus its reasons should 
be outside the framework of the model. 
In Section 2, we present the optimal private financing contract assuming single 
or double moral hazard. In Section 3, the state enters as a new player providing 
investment subsidy, success fee, or bailout (guarantee), and we analyze the char-
acteristics of the optimum with three players. Finally, in Section 4 we deduce con-
clusions of the investigation.
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rendelkezésre álló szabad forrásokat), a nettó jólétnövekedés pedig végeredményben attól 
függ, hogy melyik hatás az erősebb (Lovas–Mile, 2015). Az empirikus tapasztalatokat 
részletező szakirodalmi eredmények vegyesek (Becsky-Nagy–Fazekas, 2017; Karsai, 2015 és 
2018; Jáki–Molnár, 2017b), de a szakmai közvélekedés erősen hajlik arra, hogy 
Magyarországon a negatív hatások felülmúlják a pozitívakat (Kállay, 2014). 
Vizsgálatunk meglepő eredménye, hogy a modell feltételei mellett, ha a vállalkozó 
megfelelően motivált, akkor automatikusan a kockázati tőkés is az, tehát az egyszeres és a 
kétszeres erkölcsi kockázat kezelése lényegében nem különbözik egymástól. Ez az 
érdekegyezés csak az állami garancia esetén csúszik szét. Egyébként is nagyon számít, hogy 
az állam hogyan választja meg a támogatási formát és a támogatás mértékét. A beruházási 
támogatás és a sikerdíj, ha jól csinálják, értéket teremt, míg a garanciavállalás (vagy a 
vállalkozás ki- vagy megmentése) csak rombolja az ösztönzőket, ezért annak optimális 
mértéke a modellben nulla még akkor is, ha a pozitív externáliák nagyon jelentősek. A 
modellben tehát előáll a puha költségvetési korlát jelensége (Kornai és szerzőtársai, 2003), de 
annak keretein belül nem kapunk magyarázatot arra, hogy az államnak miért éri meg ebben a 
formában beavatkozni, annak tehát a modellen kívüli okai lehetnek.  
A tanulmány 2. fejezetében bemutatjuk az egyszeres és kétszeres erkölcsi kockázat melletti 
optimális magánfinanszírozási szerződést. A 3. fejezetben már belép az állam is beruházási 
támogatás, sikerdíj vagy kimentés (garanciavállalás) biztosításával, és megvizsgáljuk a 
háromszereplős optimum jellemzőit, végül a 4. fejezetben vonjuk le a következtetéseinket. 
 
 
2. MAGÁNFINANSZÍROZÁS 
 
2.1.Egyszeres erkölcsi kockázat 
 
Az erkölcsi kockázat elemzéséhez Tirole (2006, 115. o.) egyszeres erkölcsi kockázat melletti 
magánfinanszírozásról szóló alapmodelljének különböző kiegészítéseit használjuk. 
Feltételezzük, hogy a beruházás fix méretű, sem bővíthető, sem szűkíthető. Ez a modell 
alkalmasabb az egyedi, innovatív projektek leírására, mint az állandó skálahozadékot 
feltételező, változó beruházásos modell (lásd pl. Csóka és szerzőtársai, 2013; Berlinger és 
szerzőtársai, 2015 és 2017). Az állandó skálahozadék inkább az érettebb iparágakra jellemző, 
például, ha azok nemzetközi terjeszkedését akarjuk modellezni. A vállalkozónak van tehát 
egy projektje, amelyhez I nagyságú kezdeti beruházásra van szükség. A vállalkozónak 
azonban csak ennél kevesebb kezdeti tőke (befektethető eszköz), A áll a rendelkezésére. A 
hiányzó (I – A) nagyságú tőkét külső forrásból kell megszereznie vagy le kell mondania a 
projektről és annak minden hasznáról. 
A projekt egyperiódusú (t = 0-tól t = 1-ig tart), és két kimenete van: sikerül p valószínűséggel 
vagy kudarcot vall 1 – p valószínűséggel. A projektnek siker esetén R > 0, kudarc esetén nulla 
nagyságú ellenőhető pénzáramlása van (lásd 1. ábra). 
 
1. ábra 
A projekt teljes pénzáramlása 
 
–I 
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0. 1. 
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2. PRIVATE FINANCING
2.1 Single moral hazard
For our analysis, we elaborate on several extensions of the basic model of Tirole 
(2006, p. 115) about private financing under single moral hazard. We assume that 
the investment has a fixed volume which can be neither enlarged, nor narrowed 
down. This model fits better to describe specific innovative projects than the var-
iable-size model assuming constant return-to-scale, see e.g. (Csóka et al., 2013; 
Berlinger et al., 2015 and 2017). This latter is characteristic rather for developed 
industries, e.g. if we want to model their international expansion. Thus, the en-
trepreneur has a project which requires an initial investment I. The entrepreneur 
has, however, a smaller initial capital (investment asset) A. She must acquire the 
missing capital (I – A) from external sources or has to give up the project and 
forget about its benefits.
The project consists of a single period (from t = 0 to t = 1) and has two possible 
outcomes: either it succeeds with probability p, or fails with probability 1 – p. The 
total cash-flow of the project is R > 0, in the case of success, and zero in the case 
of failure, see Figure 1.
Figure 1
Total cash-flow of the project
Source: Tirole (2006, p.115.)
In the case of single moral hazard, the probability of the success of the project 
(p) depends solely on the entrepreneur’s behavior. If the entrepreneur makes all 
efforts for the success, i.e. if she behaves, then the success has a high probability 
p = pH, whereas low efforts induce a low probability p = pL of success (pH > pL) 
(Tirole, 2006, p.115.). 
Misbehaving may occur in several forms, e.g. the entrepreneur is lazy (shirking); 
chooses a pet project, or one which makes her indispensable (entrenchment), or 
one providing more perks, or offering good circumstances to “help” friends and 
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relatives. This latter takes us to illegal activities such as corruption, fraud, and 
stealing. 
Misbehaving may attract entrepreneurs by generating a private benefit B > 0 
which can also be considered as personal expenses of good behavior.
Moral hazard arises in the model because the financer cannot monitor the behav-
ior of the entrepreneur. This is a special case of informational asymmetry where 
the relation between financer and entrepreneur can be described as a special 
principal-agent relationship. If the entrepreneur, i.e. the agent is not motivated 
properly, then she will focus on her own interest instead of the principal’s. Thus, 
moral hazard stems from rational profit maximization and not from low morality 
(Pauly, 1968). We assume that the project’s private benefit (without externalities), 
i.e. its NPV (net present value) is positive only if behaving is guaranteed:
 (1)
Note that the project can be successful even in the case of the entrepreneur’s mis-
behaving but with a smaller probability. The success of the project depends not 
just on the entrepreneur but also on circumstances and on good or bad luck.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume similarly to the basic model (Tirole 2006, p. 
115.) that the external financer expects zero rate of return (there is no time prefer-
ence, parties are risk neutral, and financers are perfectly competitive), and the 
entrepreneur has a limited liability, so cannot be forced for further payments after 
investing her initial capital A.  It is the entrepreneur owning a special promising 
project, while there are many financers who are perfect substitutes for each other 
constituting thus a perfectly competitive market. The value is created on the en-
trepreneur’s side. The entrepreneur offers the contract and the financers compete.
We can interpret private financing as a contract design problem where two ques-
tions must be answered:
1. Will the project be financed?
2. How should the entrepreneur and the financer share the profit?
In the case of failure, the parties pay nothing to each other, so the second question 
asks how to distribute the income R between entrepreneur (Re) and financer (Ri) 
in the case of success. The contract must motivate the entrepreneur to behave. The 
inequality below expresses the condition that the entrepreneur’s expected income 
should not be less under behaving than under misbehaving (incentive constraint):
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After rearranging and applying ∆p = pH – pL, we obtain
 (2)
This implies that Re must be at least , otherwise, the entrepreneur would be 
undermotivated. Hence, the entrepreneur cannot promise (in present value) more 
than  called pledgeable income by (Tirole, 2006) and denoted by ρ. 
On the other hand, we have to ensure that participation is worth also for the 
financer. The financer is risk neutral and his expected rate of return is zero, it is 
sufficient if his expected income is not less than his investment was (participation 
constraint):
i.e.
 (3)
Constraints (2) and (3) imply (relying on R = Re + Ri) that the project can be fi-
nanced only if the entrepreneur has an initial capital at least Ā (necessary condi-
tion for financing):
 (4)
We can interpret (4) so that the NPV (pHR – I) of the project and the entrepre-
neur’s initial capital (A) together should cover the agency cost . We can also 
say that the initial capital and the pledgeable income should be sufficient for the 
investment.
Observe that (4) is also a sufficient condition of financing since we assumed that 
the competition of financers is perfect, so (3) holds with equality. The parameters 
and decision rules are known by both parties and the entrepreneur offers the con-
tract, so the entrepreneur will declare only the minimal necessary capital A = Ā. 
Thus, the entrepreneur’s initial capital in optimum is
 (5)
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Hence, our answer to the above Question 1 of type “to be, or not to be” is that 
due to moral hazard, it can occur that even projects with very high NPV are not 
financed if the entrepreneur’s capital is not sufficient. This is moreover true if the 
entrepreneur’s potential private profit (B) is big under misbehaving and/or if good 
behavior improves just slightly the probability of success (Δp is small).
Answering Question 2 about the sharing rule, the total profit (NPV) of the project 
remains at the entrepreneur, but she can get it only in the case of success, and this 
motivates her to make efforts. The expected value of the financer’s share equals 
just her investment: 
 (6)
2.2 Double moral hazard
The model of single moral hazard in the previous subsection can be generalized in 
several ways for the case of double moral hazard when the financer is not a bank 
but a venture capitalist who (hopefully) actively contributes to the success of the 
project. In this paper, we assume that the efforts of the entrepreneur and financer 
are perfect complements of each other. Sometimes, entrepreneur and financer can 
partly substitute each other, see e.g. (Tirole, 2006, p. 364.), but the model pre-
sented in this paper reflects the interdependence of the two parties better. 
Assuming perfect complements, the higher probability of success pH can be 
achieved via efforts of both parties, and if any of them misbehaves, then the prob-
ability decreases to pL, so the efforts of one player cannot make up the efforts of 
the other one.
We keep assuming that the behavior of the players matters, i.e. there exists moral 
hazard. We have to modify (1) in order that even a joint misbehaving of both par-
ties should not be worth for them:
 (7)
where C denotes the venture capitalist’s private profit (in other words, the cost of 
her efforts, C > 0).
Note that (7) is stricter than (1), so we optimize on a smaller set and if something 
satisfies (7), then it automatically meets also (1). 
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We require now, too, the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint (2) and the financer’s 
participation constraint (3). As a new condition, we have the venture capitalist’s 
incentive constraint which can be obtained similarly to the entrepreneur’s incen-
tive constraint:
 (8)
We claim that the optimal initial capital (5) deduced from (2) and (3) arising un-
der single moral hazard is still optimal in this new situation. We just have to show 
that (5) satisfies also (8). This can be verified by a simple calculation relying on
 (9)
which is a consequence of (7).
Thus, it is a surprising result that in the model of double moral hazard assuming 
a perfect complementary relation between entrepreneur and financer, the optimal 
financing contract is the same as the one under single moral hazard. In other 
words, replacing a passive bank by an active venture capitalist does not influence 
the size of the entrepreneur’s initial capital to start the project, the entrepreneur 
must possess an initial capital Ā now, too, to get finance. 
We note that the exact information about the other player’s private profit (B and 
C) is essential (common knowledge). However, in the case of informational asym-
metry, i.e. if each player knows only her own private profit, then this involves not 
just moral hazard but also adverse selection which can be managed by sophisti-
cated screening and signaling mechanisms (Lovas, 2015). In this aspect, the initial 
capital offered by the entrepreneur and the one required by the financer may grow 
to a very important factor.  
3. STATE SUBSIDY
In this section, we investigate what happens if the entrepreneur can finance her 
project not only from venture capital but also (fully or partially) from state sub-
sidy. The operation of hybrid venture capital funds (i.e. funds combining private 
and public resources) is described in (Lovas–Mile, 2015; Lovas–Riz, 2016; Jáki–
Molnár, 2017a; Karsai, 2018).
We introduce positive spillover effects (externalities) (E > 0) into the double moral 
hazard model described in the previous section. These externalities appear in-
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dependently from the success or failure of the project for example in the form 
of knowledge transfer, increased employment, or economic activity similarly to 
(Berlinger et al., 2015 and 2017). We suppose that externalities turn up in the state 
budget as explicit incomings at t = 1. Of course, private players do not take these 
positive effects into consideration, these are important only for the state. We will 
see that state has interest in the realization of the project even if venture capital 
market is not functioning well, or if private financing is not available due to insuf-
ficient initial assets of the entrepreneur.
The present value of state subsidy  cannot exceed the extra budget income com-
ing from externalities E (budget constraint):
 (10)
State subsidy is a non-refundable lump sum payment and can have three forms: it 
can be received at the beginning of the project (investment subsidy); or at the end 
of the project in the case of success (success fee); or in the case of failure (bailout 
or guarantee). We are still referring to Figure 1 where there are three states of the 
world: the present and the two possible future states. State subsidy forms under 
investigation relate to the so-called Arrow-Debreu securities, and more complex 
subsidy forms can be built up from these basic elements.
In the next subsections, we present models with three players: entrepreneur, ven-
ture capitalist, and state. Moral hazard can be double-sided on the part of the en-
trepreneur and/or the venture capitalist as in 2.2. We suppose (7), i.e. the behavior 
of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist matters from the point of view of NPV. 
There is no moral hazard related to the state because the state gives a passive 
support without participating in the realization of the project, hence her effort is 
not needed for the success. Of course, in reality, there may be inefficiencies and 
malfeasances during the determination of subsidy structures and the selection of 
the winning projects, but these are set aside, and we assume that state intervenes 
in an optimal way maximizing the aggregate utility of the project. The aggregate 
utility of the project (U) (in present value) is defined as the sum of the net present 
value (NVP) and the externalities (E) of the project minus the present value of 
state subsidy ( ):
 (11)
This is a strong assumption because private benefits (NPV) and public benefits 
(E – S~) are equally important to the state. Moreover, we exclude all public failures 
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that can be relevant in practice, for example, in reality, state is composed of in-
dividuals following their self-interest and conflicting with each other, state does 
not have all the necessary information, and state can take not only economical 
but also political aspects into consideration when shaping its economic policy. 
In the following models, the state is infinitely well-intentioned, self-consistent, 
omniscient, omnipotent, and maximizes welfare in the narrow sense of (11) under 
the budget constraint of (10). Due to these simplifying assumptions, we can focus 
on the behavior of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist and the related moral 
hazard issues.
In the following, we introduce different state subsidy forms (investment subsidy, 
success fee, guarantee) one by one, thus we examine three different cases. We sup-
pose that it is the entrepreneur who gets the state subsidy.
When determining the optimal size of the state intervention, we have to consider 
some thresholds:
 − 0 is a lower bound excluding those situations when the state gives a negative 
subsidy, for example, taxes innovative projects.
 − Smax is an upper bound coming from the state’s budget constraint.
 − S‒ is a threshold (can be both upper bound and lower bound) where the entre-
preneur is just able to get private financing from the venture capitalist which 
is also the threshold of good behavior of the entrepreneur. 
In general, the optimal size of state subsidy depends on the relative position of 
these thresholds:
 (12)
We define Sopt in a special case by listing all relevant thresholds in a table, then 
describing their meaning and their possible relative positions, and finally maxi-
mizing (11). 
3.1 Investment subsidy
In the case of an investment subsidy, the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur 
(2) remains unchanged. However, the participation constraint of the financer (3) 
is modified, as due to state subsidy, the entrepreneur needs less outside financing 
to launch her project.
 (13)
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The incentive constraint of the financer (8) does not change. As financers are per-
fectly competitive, (13) holds with equality. Expressing Ri from this and substi-
tuting it into (2), we get a necessary condition of private financing in the case of 
investment subsidy:
 (14)
As previously, we can suppose that (13) and (14) hold with equality. Expressing A 
from (14), computing Ri from (13), and substituting it into (8), we get by (7) that the 
incentive constraint of the financer holds automatically. Therefore, (14) is not only 
a necessary but also a sufficient condition of private financing. Intuitively, the 
entrepreneur can use state subsidy as her own capital to finance the investment, 
thus she needs less initial capital on her own. 
Table 1
State subsidy thresholds in the case of investment subsidy
Sign
Where  
to calculate 
from?
Value Explanation
S‒ (14) (I – A) – ρ
–  Below this level, the project can-
not be financed from private 
funds, because the good behavior 
of the entrepreneur is not ensured;
–  Above this level, the state has no 
interest to give subsidy, because u 
would decrease 
Smax (10) E The state cannot give more due to its budget constraint
Source: the author
It follows from ρ > 0 that S‒ < I – A, i.e. state subsidy is smaller than the total out-
side financing need of the project, therefore, private financing is needed, as well. If 
the state is to maximize social utility U, it should give exactly S‒ if affordable under 
the budget constraint. 
The possible relative positions and the optimal size of state subsidy (black dots) 
are presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2
Relative positions of thresholds in the case of investment subsidy 
Source: the author
In Case 1 of Figure 2, the optimal size of state subsidy is S‒ and a surplus of E – S‒ will 
remain in the state budget. State subsidy creates value both at private and public 
levels as it completes the resources of the entrepreneur and makes the project real 
which could not have been financed by venture capitalists due to moral hazard. 
In Case 2 of Figure 2, the project has too small positive externalities, thus the max-
imum affordable state subsidy does not help to reach the level needed for private 
financing. In this case, the project is not worth to be subsidized, because private 
funds are not available due to moral hazard, so the project cannot be realized.
The optimal size of state subsidy is, therefore:
 (15)
Until now, we supposed that the entrepreneur reveals honestly how much initial 
capital she has. However, if the entrepreneur is rational and knows the reaction 
function (15) of the state, her optimal strategy is to declare an A which is just nec-
essary to draw down the maximal state subsidy and to get private financing. At 
this point, S‒ = Smax, therefore:
 (16)
which will be lower than it would have been without state subsidy as E > 0 (cf. (5)). 
We can conclude that in the optimum (when all the three players are optimizing), 
state subsidy will be larger than necessary for the realization of the project and 
there will remain no surplus in the state budget (E – S‒ = E – Smax = 0). In this way, 
the entrepreneur gets not only the entire NPV of the project but also its externali-
ties E. In other words, the entrepreneur can internalize all the externalities with 
the help of state subsidy. 
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3.2 Success fee
In the case of a success fee, the incentive constraint of the entrepreneur (2) is 
changed:
 (17)
The participation constraint of the financer (3) holds again with equality. Using 
(3) and (17), a necessary condition of private financing is: 
 (18)
Similarly to the case of an investment subsidy, we can prove that with A = Āsuccess fee, 
the venture capitalist’s incentive constraint (8) also holds. Therefore, (18) is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition of private financing. 
We see from (18) that the initial capital Ā of the entrepreneur needed for private 
financing is decreased by the expected value of the success fee, hence now the 
private investor is willing to take larger stake from the investment than without 
a success fee. Consequently, in this structure, state subsidy is not crowding out, 
but on the contrary, it is boosting private funding by improving the incentives of 
the entrepreneur.
Table 2
State subsidy thresholds in the case of a success fee
Sign
Where  
to calculate 
from?
Value Explanation
S‒ (18)
–  Below this level, the project cannot be 
financed from private funds, because 
the good behavior of the entrepre-
neur is not ensured;
–  Above this level, the state has no 
interest to give subsidy, because U 
would decrease 
Smax (10) The state cannot give more due to its budget constraint
Source: the author
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The relative positions of the thresholds can be similar to those in Figure 2, so the 
optimal size of state subsidy is (15) as previously. 
This raises the question again about the optimal size of the initial capital A de-
clared by the entrepreneur. It follows from the formula of S‒ in Table 2 that a small-
er initial capital A leads to larger state subsidy S‒. The entrepreneur has interest in 
reducing A until S‒ takes its maximum, i.e. S‒ = Smax. Using formulas in Table 4, we 
get Aopt = I – p – E exactly like in the case of investment subsidy. Now again, the 
entrepreneur gets all the NPV and the externalities of the project. 
3.3 Bailout
In the case of a bailout (or guarantee), the state promises implicitly or explicitly 
that the entrepreneur will be saved in a failure. This alters the incentive constraint 
of the entrepreneur:
 (19)
The incentive constraint (3) of the private financer remains the same. Using (20) 
and (3), the necessary condition of private financing is modified, and the initial 
capital Ā needed to start the project is increased relative to the base case: 
 (20)
In this case, an initial capital equal to Ābailout is not necessarily enough to ensure 
the motivation of the venture capitalist, this depends on the parameters, espe-
cially on C. 
So, we can conclude that a state guarantee has an opposite effect than success 
fee: it destroys incentives, thus compromises private financing and increases the 
initial capital needed. In the spirit of (11), a state-financed bailout creates no value, 
moreover, it destroys value as fewer projects can be realized due to the increased 
initial capital requirement, thus NPV and E get lost, whereas state expenses are 
increasing. In this model, therefore, the optimal size of a bailout is just zero. 
A bailout is not worth to introduce even if the entrepreneur has an initial capital 
I ≤ A large enough to finance her project on her own. In this case, there is no 
need for private financing, but state subsidy may create perverse incentives for the 
entrepreneur to misbehave, hence the probability of success may drop down to pH 
which makes NPV negative according to (7). The project will be realized even in 
this case as the entrepreneur has enough money and has the interest to finance 
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it. Therefore, state guarantee either does not change or decreases the NPV of the 
project, it does not change the externality E, while it definitely increases state ex-
penses, which is not a good deal for the state by (11). Therefore, a state guarantee 
decreases the project’s benefits U even if venture capital is not needed. 
Summing up, in these models, even large positive externalities do not justify 
state-financed bailout as it is just a present to the entrepreneur financed from 
public money which has no effect in the best case and effectively destroys incen-
tives in the worst case.  
4. CONClUSIONS
We can answer now the question in the title of the paper: There are many ways 
how the state can destroy innovation financing. 
The first problem is if the state spends too much on innovation financing and 
consequently neglects areas with weaker market mechanisms but of fundamental 
importance regarding not just innovation but the welfare of the entire commu-
nity. Such areas are e.g. education and fundamental research.  
Besides allocational difficulties, several problems can occur also in designing and 
operating subsidy systems if the state is unable or unwilling to maximize social 
welfare. There is a long list of state failures due to informational problems, bu-
reaucratic coordination, or corruption, but even the definition of social welfare 
might be problematic. In the models of this paper, we assumed that all the three 
parties, namely entrepreneur, venture capitalist, and state possess all necessary 
information, make decisions along clear goals, and know also the reaction func-
tions of each other. If this is not the case, and it definitely does not hold in the real 
world, then we get a lower efficiency.
A further difficulty can be if state subsidy harms the entrepreneur’s incentives, we 
focus mainly on this problem in this paper. In our models, this cannot occur with 
an investment subsidy and success fee. If also private funding is needed to start a 
project, then misbehavior is excluded since private financer enters only with this 
condition, so the mere fact of private financing has a disciplining effect. If the 
entrepreneur finances the project alone with the help of state subsidy, then success 
ensures her to get the total profit without sharing it with others. As we assumed 
that the project’s NPV is positive in the case of success and negative otherwise, it 
follows that the entrepreneur is motivated perfectly to make efforts in these cir-
cumstances, too. Hence, seemingly, an investment subsidy and success fee do not 
harm incentives, in fact, these get even improved in the frame of the model. This 
could be a nice example of cooperation between market and state where the lat-
ter compensates the missing capital bringing the project to a stage where private 
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financing can already enter. State capital thus acts as a sort of catalyzer helping to 
realize projects which could not have been financed by the market without state 
subsidy.
This sounds nice, but the situation is not that advantageous, unfortunately. The 
possibility of investment subsidy or success fee motivates entrepreneurs to declare 
less initial capital, just as much as needed to get maximal possible state subsidy. 
Then the state spends all the externalities on the project in optimum, and the en-
trepreneur gets this extra gift from the public money besides the NPV. There will 
be many projects which could have been financed by the market, and the positive 
externalities would have remained in the state budget for community purposes, 
but the possibility of state subsidy makes entrepreneurs hide their own capital, 
and thus acquire all or most externalities for themselves. The state can practically 
never know the number of projects which would have been aborted without the 
subsidy program versus the ones which would have been realized anyway, and 
the entrepreneur used state subsidy just to acquire an extra profit. If the rate of 
the latter projects is large, then even an optimal state subsidy structure is wasting 
public money.
A starting point of the models was assuming that state subsidy does not modify 
the private profits (B and C) arising from the players’ misbehavior. This is a real-
istic assumption in the case of shirking since the value of free time is always the 
same. Concerning other forms of abuse, however, state subsidy may even increase 
the private profits since state control may be weaker than the financer’s control. 
Moreover, this may occur not just on the entrepreneur’s side (B), but also on the 
financer’s side (C) depending on the construction. If this effect is significant, then 
also investment subsidy and success fee can destroy incentives and the total effect 
will be negative.
By conditions of the model, guarantee (or bailout) acts as a perverse incentive, 
therefore, it is not recommended even with extremely large positive externalities. 
The optimal size of a state guarantee is zero in the model. In the real world, some-
times it may be conceivable that state guarantee still creates value, e.g. assuming 
risk-averse players when it is impossible or very hard to hedge risks on the capital 
markets, but we must be aware that this structure harms incentives seriously in 
any case and so the trade-off not necessarily pays off.
The model of guarantee demonstrates the phenomenon of soft budget constraint 
(Kornai et al., 2003) when the promise of state bailout perverts the behavior of 
the players and both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist are less willing 
to work for the success of the project. Our theoretical model, however, gives no 
hints about the state’s possible interest in a bailout, this must have reasons outside 
the model. Kornai et al. (2003) explain this phenomenon with time-inconsistent 
decision-making.
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Finally, we mention that the continuous investment model by Berlinger et al. (2015 
and 2017) found that state subsidy creates value anyway even in the form of guar-
antee in the case of single moral hazard. Their paper concluded that the problems 
occurring in practice are due to errors in realization and not to state subsidy. In 
their model, the private financer could convert the wrong subsidy form, i.e. guar-
antee into success fee. Thus, we can expect financial intermediaries to transform 
not only cash-flow and risks but also incentives. In the present paper, however, 
we assumed that the state subsidizes the entrepreneur directly and the financer 
cannot change the subsidy system afterward. This difference implies the explicitly 
negative effect of guarantee now. Therefore, designing subsidy systems, we have 
to pay a distinguished attention to the cooperation with financial intermediaries, 
including the timing of state subsidy and private financing.
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